Findings from a study to explore organizational alternatives available to states for overseeing educational reform are presented in this paper. The structures and uses of eight exemplary state accountability mechanisms were analyzed. Seven of these mechanisms have already been implemented in South Carolina, Connecticut, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, New York, and California, and one is in the development stage. In each state, indepth telephone interviews were conducted with two to three state education staff. The first section analyzes the organization and design ot different types of accountability mechanisms and highlights the various ways in which states approach accountability. The second section discusses how the approaches have worked by examining their uses and consequences. The concluding section proposes a set of critical components for state accountability mechanisms based on the positive experiences of the states studied. Five criteria for a state accountability mechanism include empowerment by state gove:nment, monitoring as a primary mission, independence from implementors, strong relationships with parties external to the government, and communication with multiple constituencies. Three tables are included. (29 references) (LMI)
With the school reform movement of the 1980s, state policy makers have made major monetary and political investments in education. State budgets feature new money for education; on state agendas, improving the quality of education is a high priority.
As state commitments have increased so have demands for accountability.
In a recent survey by the National Conference of State Legislatures, accountability was identified as a top priority of committee chairmen, and when the 1989 state legislative sessions opened, more than thirty states had accountability issues scheduled for discussion (Pipho, 1989 An accountability mechanism in education is defined as a body or group that uses educational indicators to track the progress of educabion policy --are state education reforms improving schools?
Its function is to oversee (monitor and evaluate) the performance of the education system and to propose needed changes to policy makers. Effective accountability mechanisms feed information into the policy cycle, improve schools, and according to the National Association of State School Boards, should be "biased toward
action." Their purpose should be "not just to inform the public 2 on the state of education, but to take significant action" (1988, p. 8 (1988, p. 16). Cibulka (1989) further found in his study of accountability systems in Illinois and South Carolina that the state is a critically important motivator of local school districts:
...among South Carolina school officials interviewed, virtually every superintendent was able to cite some positive change in policy and practice which ensued due to the [state] accountability process The central point is that the state policy facilitated the likelihood that local action would be taken (p. 9).
In fact, policy studies have found that state reforms enhance local activism; as districts often respond to state initiatives by adding to them (Fuhrman & Elmore, 1990; Verstegen, 1988 However, the standard conclusion in research on the 3 oversight process is that oversight is a neglected function largely because policy committees prefer spw.ding time on more politically appealing activities.
Rosenthal (1981) , in a study of state legislatures, observed that the political rewards for introducing and passing new legislation are greater than those associated with monitoring implementation of existing legislation, which is timeconsuming and less often leads to substantial or concrete results:
"Legislators try to achieve concrete results, but oversight seldom leads to the elimination of governmertal programs or to the generation of large budgetary savings" (Rosenthal, 1981, p.119) .
Therefore, during the legislative session, policy development activities, which give legislators opportunities to enhance their prospects for reelection (Mayhew, 1974) , take center stage and little time is available for oversight of existing programs.
State departments of education also have traditionally been involved in overseeing the implementation of education policies and programs.1
For instance, state departments often receive requests from legislative policy committees to conduct monitoring or evaluation studies. In the 1980s, the popular "top-down" approach to education reform has put a squeeze on departments.
State departments of education have more responsibilities but resources, including money and staff, remain fairly constant (Fuhrman, 1989a Prior research on legislative oversight (Bibby, 1968; Kaiser, 1977; Ogul, 1976; Rosenthal, 1981 ) A second strength in the design of the mechanisms following the legislative oversight committee model is their limited scope of authority. Prior research on state legislatures (Wohlstetter, 1989) shows that oversight is not neglected by legislative committees when oversight is among the committee's stated In Virginia, the committee's agenda is limited, subjectwise, by a review cycle that focuses committee activity on particular policy areas. For example, when education was evaluated over a two-and-a-half to three-year period, some (not all) of the other policy areas also were reviewed.
Studies of Congress by Bibby (1968) and Ogul (1976) Executive Branch Model Accountability mechanisms housed in the executive branch are more easily subject to charges of "conflicts of interest" than mechanisms that are independent of implementing agencies.
The accountability mechanism described in this section illustrates how the executive branch can retain some independence and effectively monitor education reform. Prior research has shown that political variables, such as the balance of power between the state and local districts, influence the development, implementation and monitoring of education reform (Fuhrwan, 1989b; Wohlstetter, 1989 The select committee also functions as a clearinghouse for all proposed EIA changes: legislative amendments and budget proposals are considered by standing committees only after tha select committee's recommendation or approval.
Linkages to various constituencies, both within and outside government, have been a key strength of South Carolina's mechan3sm, according to the executive director of the subcommittee. Research on implementation suggests that education reforms need time to mature, ard that changes in practice and performance lag behind electoral cycles (Elmore & McLaughlin, 1988) .
As a result, the original coalitions that work to support education reform may be broken up by elections before the reforms mature. The newlyelected leaders, moreover, may not have the same commitment to the reforms as their predecessors (Thomas, 1987 I think it is just a given that agencies of government have a tendency Ito serve themselves rather than the clients they were established to serve...I think once the accountability portion of any agency is subsumed by that agency the chances for abuse are far greater than if the accountability program is an independent process (Thomas, 1987 outside the system feed important study findings into the policy process." PACE also has a "superb relationship with the media" and has developed somewhat of an expertise in dealing with the press. For example, press conferences are held for all major reports to comment on the findings. The publicity, of course, adds visibility to the issues and puts pressure on the policy makers to act or, at least, pay attention.
The last accountability mechanism in the sample creates ex. licit government contracts with performance auditors in the private sector. This mechanism has not yet been tested in the field of education; however, the concept is not new. In fact, most BigEight accounting firms have performance audit divisions and some smaller firms specialize in performance audits. One strength of the mechanism is its independence from the implementors of education reform, namely departments of education and local school districts. As evaluation specialists, performance auditors arguably would have fewer conflicts of interest than mechanisms with ties to the education community.
Despite its independence, the performance auditor mechanism still would depend on monitoring data typically collected by Another unique feature of this mechanism would be the specificity of its legislative mandate. In the transit industly, authorizing legislation specifies data elements that transit operators must collect (e.g. vehicle miles, in-service mechanical failures), and assessment measures (ratios of data elements) that auditors must use to evalutt)
performance (e.g., number of vehicle miles per in-service fai,Lures), in addition to a three-year evaluation cycle.
A similar approach to education may be just around the corner. Kaagan & Coley, 1989 and Shavelson et al., 1987) .
Uses and Consequences at Accountability Mechanisms Weiss (1989) where the legislature meets only every other year, the LEB has been instrumental "in keeping education issues on the front burner and alive with the public and the press." In South Carolina, where business community representatives serve with educators and legislators on the Business-Education Subcommittee, the mechanism has helped retain significant business interest in education.
"Business has been a major partner in selling education reform,"
commented the state superintendent of education. The mechanism also has fostered healthy working relationships among participants.
'There were times, early on, when there would be a C.E.O.
sitting next to a teacher, and they would barely speak to one another,' said Terry Peterson, the subcommittee's executive director. 'Now, they'll sit by each other and talk' (Flax, Education pm.form gAn Improve Secondary 12h22.12, the PACE study sampled only schools that were improving and documented the reform's benefits (Odden & Marsh, 1988 Through its analysis of monitoring data, the Select Oversight Committee on Education discovered significant differences between small-rural and big-city school districts regarding programs and funding.
The oversight committee's report received considerable press coverage, and rural districts learned for the first time that programs being implemented in the big cities were unavailable in their districts. Since then a lawsuit on behalf of small school systems has been filed against the state to remedy the inequities between Tennessee's rural and big-city districts.
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As mentioned at the outset, the purpose of this study was to Accountability mechanisms that actively publicize monitoring results help stimulate and maintain interest in education reform. Publicity also puts pressure on policy makers to act or, at least, pay attention to the reforms. Table 3 indicates the extent to which the mechanisms in the study sample possess these five characteristics.
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